Sociologists (He, 2003; Latham & Feuchtwang, 2020) often analyse the evolution of China’s social space governance through a diachronic lens: the Danwei system as the foundation of social organization, the Shequ system as a transitional mode, and the community as the future goal of Shequ development. This paper challenges this linear evolutionary perspective by examining the relationships between Danwei, Shequ, and community. It posits that Danwei is not a precursor to Shequ; both share administrative and social function similarities without a direct developmental link. Furthermore, Shequ does not necessarily aim for civil society’s flourishing as communities do, given their distinct governance actors. The proposed linear progression from Danwei to Shequ to community is oversimplified; instead, Shequ oscillates between Danwei and community, resembling the pendulum movement as Leach’s model of Kachin Society (Leach, 1970).

The comparability of Danwei, Shequ, and community lies in that under certain conditions, they may exhibit similar forms: defined living areas with active employment, commercial exchanges, cultural activities, and educational services. However, the similarity in spatial form and function does not imply homogeneity among the three. They differ in their origins, driving forces, and social relations within the space, making it essential to distinguish between them.

Danwei is a unique organizational form that emerged during the era of the planned economy. Within Danwei, employees were provided with lifelong employment positions, a comprehensive welfare system, and public facility support. In terms of living space, Danwei offered employee dormitories near workplaces with extensive communal facilities, achieving ‘work-life integration’ and fostering close interpersonal relationships. Backed by the Hukou (户口, household registration) system and quota system, which strictly controlled the movement of people and production factors, there was a strong sense of personal dependency within the organization (Walder, 1988, pp. 30–32). All social activities of the workers fundamentally depended on their attachment to the Danwei. It is not an exaggeration to say that Danwei endowed its members with the rights, identities, and legitimacy of social actions.

The fundamental attribute of Danwei is its economic nature. As Andrew Walder insightfully argues, the primary significance of Danwei lies in the characteristics of its workplaces (1988, p. 8). The comprehensive social services and the much-discussed “work-life integration” production and living circles are merely by-products intended to facilitate production.

Beyond its economic characteristics, Danwei also possesses a strong administrative colour, taking on grassroots management functions. At the national governance level, Danwei serves as the periphery of a highly organized and hierarchical state apparatus. As Wang Huning profoundly summarizes, Danwei is a unique organizational and social regulatory form in Chinese urban society (Wang, 1995). It constituted the basic social regulatory unit, economic activity unit, and resource distribution unit during the planned economy period. Danwei took on social service functions beyond economic production — qiye ban shehui (企业办社会, enterprises running society) — not only as a feasible approach to organizing power but also as a necessary requirement to maintain social operations. Under the principle of qiye ban shehui, Danwei gradually became a nearly total institution (See Goffman, 2007), integrating production, business, living, and emotional functions. In larger Danwei, canteens, dormitories, educational institutions, and entertainment venues were all available, enabling Danwei to exist independently from society. ¹

With the deepening of market-oriented reforms in the 1990s, which called for the ‘liberation’ and ‘circulation’ of production factors, the highly dependent Danwei system could no longer meet the demands of China’s economic and political transformation. In the wave of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Reform, Danwei could no longer provide their employees with the generous ‘cradle-to-grave’ resources and services as before. Meanwhile, the 1994 Tax-Sharing Reform triggered the booming development of real estate driven by land finance (Li et al., 2013, p. 1142).

After 1998, the legacy of the Danwei system, the ‘welfare housing system’, was officially replaced by commercial housing, with commercial residential communities replacing Danwei dormitories as the main urban living units. It was also during this period that Shequ gradually replaced Danwei as the basic unit of urban governance. After the collapse of the Danwei system, its considerable functions were transferred to Shequ. Shequ largely took on the role of Danwei: cooperating with administrative organs in management and providing limited public services (Bray, 2005). However, Shequ, unlike Danwei, rely on public finance largely, many Shequ are alienated into subordinate units of governments.

Shequ is often compared with Danwei, partly because they represent two phases in the evolution of China’s urban residential patterns and grassroots governance models (Chai, 2014). This comparison, however, obscures the fundamental attributes of Danwei and Shequ — Danwei is essentially an economic production unit where work occurs, with its residential function being a derived ‘secondary attribute’; in contrast, Shequ is premised on a group of people living together in a shared space, with economic exchanges, political participation, and other interactions built on this foundation.

Although scholars recognize that the market reforms of the 1990s and the impact on the Danwei system were significant reasons for the widespread establishment of Shequ in China, their analysis of the construction process of the Shequ system often starts from 1979 (Latham & Feuchtwang, 2020, p. 133). Viewing the collapse of the Danwei system as the starting point for the Shequ system does not fully explore the roots of Shequ. Shequ is not merely a ‘turn’ following the disintegration of Danwei, but rather a ‘revival’ of the historically subordinate ‘Jieju’ (街居, neighbourhood) system. Historically, Jieju existed alongside the Danwei system, initially intended to reorganize the idle population outside of Danwei within a certain residential space as an auxiliary organization. Following pilot programs in cities like Shanghai and Shenyang in the 1990s, Shequ gradually emerged on the foundation of Jieju.

In Ferdinand Tonnies’ dichotomy of ‘community-society’, he defines community as a lasting bond of common life (Tonnies & Loomis, 2002, p. 62). This definition does not align with current practices of community but coincides with the characteristics of Danwei.

The occupational diversity within a community means that it serves merely as a place of residence rather than a comprehensive living space, and high personnel mobility cannot ensure the stability of communal living. The so-called “common life,” fragmented by commuting patterns and daily routines, is only accurately described in the coarse granularity of shared geographic location. In contrast, it can be said that Danwei encompasses a life scenario lasting an employee’s lifetime. Moreover, with Danwei dormitories lacking private toilets, bathrooms, or kitchens, people’s living scenes highly overlap. This spatial co-presence necessitates interpersonal interactions, forming what Fei Xiaotong describes as a ‘society of acquaintances’(熟人社会) (Fei, 1998, p. 9). In the current conception of the Chinese government, community is not seen as the ideal model for the development of Shequ. Instead, Danwei shares a more similar vision and design with Shequ. Although community has integrated a significant amount of administrative effort in its revival following ‘the Third Way’ (Minch, 2011, p. 16), it is still more often defined within the ‘civil society’ category. However, for the designers within the Chinese government, especially those at the higher echelons of the party, ‘civil society’ is not seen as an inevitable outcome—rather, the leadership of the party is deemed more critical.

In addressing the issue of empowering communities, Xi Jinping does not focus on fully mobilizing civil forces but paternalistically asserts that ‘the key is to strengthen the leadership of the Party’ (Yang & Ye, 2021, p. 56). Compared to expanding the participation of social forces, what the authorities care more about is ‘ensuring the correct direction of social forces’ participation in community governance’ (Li, 2021). In practical reality, as observed by scholars, former community centre—Resident Committees are gradually being replaced by Party Service Centres (党群服务中心) (Wu et al., 2022, p. 122). The existence and development of the Communist Party of China (CPC) have become a prerequisite for co-governance, which is at the core of the community agenda. It can be said that there is an essential difference between the current Shequ and community — Shequ, rather than being an autonomous organization, is primarily an instrumental organization under the leadership and surveillance of the CPC. The subjectivity of the ‘civil society’ and ‘civil forces’ that community relies on is thoroughly deprived. Despite this, it is still premature to assert that community is no longer a potential direction for the development of Shequ. As the administrative supervisory function of Shequ continues to strengthen, there is a tangible trend towards transformation into community. Even if governance within the Internet is an important means for the CPC to strengthen management, this process also provides an organizational foundation for the formation of real community collectives and community collective actions.

During the implementation of the Zero-COVID Policy, to ensure large-scale PCR screening and distribution of supplies, community workers joined residents’ WeChat groups to reach every household. The chatgroup as a spatial foundation not only lowered the participation threshold (not becoming a retirees’ association due to the need to work and lack of time) but also included a wide range of tenants, representing a real collective of people living in the community. Chatgroups significantly influenced social life in the offline world (Burrell, 2009). In this process, residents were not just passive receivers of information; they confirmed a common identity within the ‘resident—worker’ pattern. In the internet space, free from the accusation of ‘illegal assembly’, they began to collectively pressurize the ‘government’ to fight for their rights. This seems to suggest that communities will continue to oscillate between the remnants of Danwei and the concept of community.

Bibliography

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